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We  examine  the  implication  of  direct  and  indirect  foreign  competition  on  domestic 
innovation  decision.  In  most  of  the  existing  theoretical  analyses  the  foreign  firms  are 
assumed to enter the domestic-country market as an exporter and thus are subject to a tariff 
duty imposed by the local government. We consider a broader setting where the foreign firm 
also has the option of setting up a production unit in the domestic country to supply output to 
the domestic country. This enables it to avoid the tariff that it faces due to export. Once we 
allow for such a strategy option for the foreign firm, competition becomes more direct and 
intense since tariffs no longer discount for the technological inferiority of home firms. We 
show that innovation by the home firm will be discouraged at high tariffs under the threat of 
DFI. Again at low tariff rates exports by the foreign firm make market competition more 
intense  and  reduce  the  incentive  for  innovation.  Hence  the  home  firm  always  (never) 
innovates at low (high) R&D cost whatever be the tariff rate. For intermediate R&D cost the 
home firm innovates if the foreign firm opts for exports.   
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
Innovation and product development are important survival strategies of the firms in 
the long run. But uncertainties in the outcome of R&D investment, weak patent laws 
prevent  full  appropriation  of  innovation  benefits  when  it  is  successful  and  often 
discourages firms to invest large sums of money in R&D. Market structure, nature and 
intensity of competition and government policy also influence in one way or the other 
the innovation decision of firms (Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1999), Kamien and Schwartz 
(1991), Schumpeter (1943)). 
Since  the  earliest  investigations  of  the  role  of  these  factors,  the  implications  of 
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liberal government policies that put the incumbent local firms in competition with the 
foreign  firms  (who  may  be  technologically  superior)  have  been  debated  without 
generating  any  theoretical  consensus.  Competition  from  the  foreign  firms  may  be 
indirect - when tariffs are lowered to allow local traders and consumers to import goods 
that are similar to what has been locally produced - or, direct, when the foreign firms are 
allowed to set up their production units and to make business in the host country. There 
is a huge and well developed literature on the effect of liberal trade policies and indirect 
foreign competition on local firms’ innovation decisions and innovation levels. In this 
context, analyses of Bouet (2001), Clemenz (1990), Reitzes (1991) and Rodrik (1992) 
deserve particular attention. Reitzes (1991) and Bouet (2001) show that tariff induces the 
local firm to increase its cost reducing R&D activities. Contrarily Rodrik (1992) argues 
that  protection  by  ensuring  a  larger  domestic  market  increases  the  domestic  firm’s 
incentive  for  cost  reducing  innovation.  Clemenz  (1990)  compares  R&D  levels  of  a 
foreign firm and a home firm under autarky and free trade and shows that if the initial 
technological  gap  is  sufficiently  small  free  trade  stimulates  the  R&D  of  both  firms. 
Some studies also compare the effect of tariff with other instruments of trade policy, 
namely quota, voluntary export restriction, export subsidy etc. Bouet (2001) compares 
the  effect  of tariff with  VER. Reitzes (1991) analyses  different impact of quota and 
tariffs on cost reducing R&D. 
On the other hand, there are some empirical studies regarding the effect of direct 
foreign  competition  in  the  form  of  DFI  on  R&D  in  host  country.  Hubert  and  Nigel 
(2001) investigate the impact of direct investment by the foreign-owned companies on 
technical progress in the UK manufacturing sector and find that the foreign-owned firms 
have a significant positive effect on the level of technical efficiency in domestic firms. 
Guoyong (2003) investigates the impact of DFI on the competition and innovation in 
China’s  telecom  equipment  manufacturing  industry.  He  finds  that  entry  of  MNCs 
increases  the  degree  of  product  market  competition  and  promotes  innovation.  In  the 
context  of  India,  “with  respect  to  the  contribution  of  DFI  to  local  technological 
capability and technology diffusion, the studies find a mixed evidence” (Kumar (2005)).   
However,  in  a  regime  of  liberal  trade  and  investment  policies  in  a  developing 
country, indirect foreign competition (i.e., imports) and direct foreign competition (i.e., 
DFI) are not exogenous factors. Rather, these are the outcome of the decision of the 
foreign firms regarding the mode of entry. For example, the tariff-jumping theory of DFI 
argues that high tariff on imports may induce the foreign firms to set up subsidiaries in 
the host country if there is no restriction on such investments. This choice over the mode 
of entry and investment barriers which is falling down in the present era of globalization 
make  it  relevant  to  put  together  the  disjoint  literatures  on  the  effect  of  foreign 
competition  on  local  R&D  decision  as  reviewed  above.  This  is  precisely  what  the 
present paper attempts. 
For the purpose we consider a broader setting where the foreign firm has two modes 
of entry. It can set up a new plant in a domestic (or host) country to produce output and 
supply  to  the  local  market  or  it  may  export  the  product  by  giving  tariff  to  local INNOVATION UNDER THE THREAT OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT  83 
government.  Generally  there  are  two  modes  of  DFI;  one  greenfield  DFI  (new  plant 
investment) and other non-green field DFI (mergers and acquisition). In this model only 
green field DFI (setting of a new plant) is considered. The reason behind it is that when 
firms have firm-specific knowledge, they presumably want to engage in greenfield DFI 
instead of mergers and acquisition to minimize the chance that others would gain access 
to this knowledge (Neven and Siotis (1996)). We also ignore technology or productivity 
spillover effect because economists are not unanimous about the spillover effect of DFI. 
Once we allow for such a strategy option for the foreign firm, competition becomes 
more direct and intense since tariffs no longer discount for the technological inferiority 
of the home firms. Of course, this is quite in line with the liberal trade and investment 
policies of the developing countries. We assume that in competition the home firm may 
innovate a fixed amount with some fixed R&D cost. In this set up, we examine the 
implication of foreign competition on the innovation decision of home firm, i.e., whether 
it will innovate or not. At comparatively high tariff rates the foreign firm opts for DFI, 
but this discourages innovation of the home firm. On the other hand, at low tariff rates 
exports  by  the  foreign  firm  is  profitable.  But  such  indirect  competition  reduces  the 
incentive of innovation as well. The result we obtain is that the possibility of domestic 
innovation is very much restricted under liberalization unless the innovation cost itself is 
very low.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a duopoly model to 
show the innovation decision of the home firm when we allow two modes of entry by 
the foreign firm under liberalization. Subsection 2.1 describes the strategies of the firms 
and subsection 2.2  describes the structure  of the  model. Section 3 is  devoted to the 
determination of choices of strategies by the firms under liberalization.   
 
 
2.    MODEL 
 
2.1.    Firms and Strategies 
 
In protective regime there is only one home firm in the industry which has monopoly 
power in the home market. In the post liberalization situation there are two firms in the 
industry; one is home firm and another is foreign firm and they are engaged in Cournot 
duopoly  game.  The  home firm is technologically inefficient which is reflected in its 
higher marginal cost of production,  c , relative to the foreign marginal cost, 
* c . The 
home firm has, however, an option of investing in a cost reducing R&D. The foreign 
firm has two options. It can produce the good in its own country and export the output at 
zero cost or it can set up production unit in the home country. If it decides to cater to the 
home market through exports, it faces an import duty imposed by the local government. 
The disincentive for DFI is, on the other hand, the cost of setting up a plant. 
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2.2.    Structure of the Model 
 
Demand Function 
Let the demand function of the ith firm be linear and in inverse form is given by the 
equation 
 
2 , 1 , ; , = ¹ - - = j i j i q q p j i a ,                                                                            (1) 
 
where  p   is the price of the product and  i q   is quantity demanded for the ith firm’s 
product and products are homogenous. 
 
Cost Function 
Under  protection  production  technology  of  home  firm  be  denoted  is  constant 
marginal cost,  c . After liberalization we assume that only one foreign firm enters with 
superior  technology  of  production  shown  by  constant  marginal  cost   
* c   such  that 
* c c >   and we assume  0
* = c   to simplify the algebra. Thus the larger is the value of 
home marginal cost  c , higher will be the initial difference in technical efficiency. The 
technology gap is  c c c = -
* . The foreign firm may export the product by giving tariff, 
t   to the domestic government or it may invest directly for local production. There is a 
fixed amount of DFI, say  F . In competition with the foreign firm, the home firm may 
undertake process innovating R&D in order to reduce the marginal cost of production. 
We assume that the output of R&D is fixed and it is equal to the technology gap,  c   and 
there is a fixed R&D cost, say,  R . This means by doing R&D home firm will equalize 
its marginal cost with foreign firm. 
 
 
3.    CHOICE OF STRATEGIES BY THE FIRMS   
 
We  assume  that  in  competition  at  first  the  firms  choose  their  strategies 
simultaneously. Then they simultaneously decide on their output levels. In this case, we 
essentially have two stages. In the first stage, the firms simultaneously decide about their 
strategy options as defined above, given the import tariff  t , R and F and in the second 
stage they decide about how much to supply and profits are realized thereafter. Let us 
begin with the second stage. 
 
Second Stage 
Given the linear demand function as defined in (1), the profit level of the foreign 
firm is given by, where outputs of the home firm and foreign firm are denoted by  1 q  
and  2 q   respectively 
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[ ] 2 2 1 2 q t q q
E - - - = a p ,                                                                                            (2) 
 
when it decides to cater the domestic country through exports and 
 
[ ] F q q q
DFI - - - = 2 2 1 2 a p ,                                                                                      (3) 
 
when it decides to set up a plant at the home country at a fixed cost F. 
On the other hand, the home firm’s profit is equal to 
 
[ ] R q q q
I - - - = 1 2 1 1 a p ,                                                                                            (4) 
 
when it invests a fixed sum  R   in R&D which lowers its marginal cost to the level of 
that of foreign firm (which is set to zero) with certainty.
1  But if it decides not to invest 
in the R&D, it can realize 
 
[ ] 1 2 1 1 q c q q
NI - - - = a p .                                                                                          (5) 
 
Given these  profit  functions, it  is easy  to check the  following  profit  maximizing 
output  levels  and  realized  profit  levels  under  different  strategy  combinations  (as 
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1 Uncertainty in R&D output will not give any quantitative change of our results but will unnecessarily 







































DFI NI - = a p ,                                                                                              (16) 
( ) F c




a p .                                                                                        (17) 
 
Both second order and stability conditions hold in all the four cases. However, for 
the  existence  of  duopoly  equilibrium,  we  need  to  impose  certain  restrictions  on  the 
parameters  of  the  model.  First,  as  evident  from  (6),  the  foreign  firm  will  export  a 
positive amount, given that the home firm invests in cost reducing R&D only if the level 




t t º <
a
.                                                                                                                (18) 
 
Otherwise, the foreign firm will not enter the domestic market as an exporter and the 
home firm will continue to enjoy its monopoly position. The restriction defined in (18) 
also ensures that the foreign firm will supply a positive amount even when the home 
firm does not innovate. Secondly, when the home firm does not innovate, the foreign 








2  Otherwise the foreign firm will not 
enter at all as exporter. 
On the other hand, from (15) it appears that when the foreign firm sets up a plant in 
the domestic country and produces all its output there, the home firm can survive in the 




< c .                                                                                                                      (19) 
 
This  also  guarantees,  though  not  necessary,  that  the  home  firm  survives  in 
competition even when the foreign firm enters as an exporter (and the home firm does 
 
2 More  precisely,  in  such  a  case,  0 ,











  Thus,  the  level  of  prohibitive 
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not innovate).   
There are in addition the following two viability conditions requiring that innovation 
by the home firm and organizing production in the domestic country by the foreign firm 






a £ R .                                                                                                                (20i) 
 
It also ensures the viability of innovation when the foreign firm exports. 





a £ F .                                                                                                              (20ii) 
 
It also ensures the profitability of DFI, even when the home firm does not innovate. 
Of course, these restrictions by themselves do not imply that DFI is profitable to the 
export option. Two comments are warranted. First, the usual tie-breaking rule is applied, 
i.e.,  if  the  net  profit  from  innovation  (or  DFI)  is  exactly  zero,  the  firm  innovates 
(produces).  Second,  the  same  restrictions  ensure  that  the  home  (foreign)  firm  will 
innovate (produce) regardless of the strategy of the foreign (home) firm. 
 
First Stage 
Given  these  output  decisions  and  consequent  profit  levels  realized  in  the  second 
stage, we now look at the strategy choices in the first stage. For non-trivial strategy 
choices we will confine ourselves with any tariffs defines in (18), because only for these 
tariff levels positive output and profit levels can be realized for the “exporting” foreign 
firm regardless of whether the home firm innovates or not.   
Let us start with the strategy choice of the home firm. If the foreign firm adopts the 








DFI NI DFI I p p , 
 
which boils down to, after substitution of values from (10) and (16), 
 
( ) R c c ³ - a
9
4
.                                                                                                        (21) 
 
For  2 / a < c , this obeys the viability condition of innovation given in (20i). Strict 
equality  defines  the  value  of  R  for  which  the  home  firm  is  indifferent  between SOMA ROY AND RAJAT ACHARYYA  88
innovation and no-innovation. 
 
( ) R c c R
DFI = - º a
9
4
.                                                                                            (22) 
 
On the other hand, if the foreign firm chooses to export, then the home firm will 







E NI E I p p , 
 
which boils down to, after substitution of values from (7) and (13) 
 
( ) R t c c ³ + - a
9
4
.                                                                                                    (23) 
 
Strict equality defines the pair of t and R such that local firm is indifferent between 
innovation and no-innovation. Thus 
 
( ) ( ) R t c c t R
E = + - º a
9
4
.                                                                                      (24) 
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,  the  home  firm  possesses  monopoly  power  if  it  innovates. 
Otherwise there is duopoly in domestic market. In this case home firm will innovate if 





1 p p > , 






a a , 
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These curvature properties and inequalities help us to draw Figure 1. The curves 
DFI R and ( ) t R
E   divide the decision space of the home firm leveled as (a), (b), (c), (d) in 
Figure 1 for different strategies of foreign firm. INNOVATION UNDER THE THREAT OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT  89 
















Figure 1.    Decision Space of Home firm 
 
 
Lemma 1.   
DFI R R < " , innovation is the dominating strategy of the home firm. 
 
Proof 
From (22) and (24) it follows that 
 
( ) t t R R
E DFI " < .                                                                                                (26) 
 
Thus, by (21) and (23) 
DFI R R < " . 
DFI NI DFI I ,
1
,
1 p p > , 
E NI E I ,
1
,
1 p p > . 
Hence the claim. 
 
In region (a) of Figure 1, the dominating strategy of the home firm is innovation. 
 
Lemma 2.    ( ) t R R
E > " , dominating strategy of the home firm is no-innovation. 
 
Proof 
Given (26), it immediately follows that  ( ) t R R
E > " . 
E NI E I ,
1
,
1 p p < . 
DFI NI DFI I ,
1
,
1 p p < . 
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In Region (c) of Figure 1, the dominating strategy of the home firm is no-innovation. 
 
Lemma 3.    For  ( ) t R R R
E DFI < < , the home firm’s strategy is conditional upon the 
strategy choice of the foreign firm. 
 
Proof 
When R is within the intermediate range i.e., ( ) t R R R
E DFI < < , no such dominating 
strategy exists. Optimal strategy of the home firm then depends on the strategy chosen 
by the foreign firm. If foreign firm goes for DFI, the home firm prefers no-innovation. 
On the other hand if foreign firm exports, the home firm innovates.   
 
DFI R R > " , by (21) 
DFI NI DFI I ,
1
,
1 p p < , 
( ) t R R
E < " , by (23) 
E NI E I ,
1
,
1 p p > . 
Hence the claim. 
 
Region (b) of Figure 1 corresponds to all (t, R),  2 / a < "t   for which  ( ) t R R R
E DFI < <  




t t R R
E +







, p p >   by (25). 
Thus  in  Region  (b)  the  home  firm  adopts  two  different  strategies  for  different 
strategy choices of the foreign firm. But in region (d), where  2 / a > t   the foreign firm 
has only one mode of entry, i.e., DFI if the home firm does not innovate. So in Region 
(d) the home firm possesses monopoly power by innovating or it does not innovate if the 
foreign firm goes for DFI. 
 
Let us now consider the strategy choice of the foreign firm.   
If the home firm chooses to innovate, then the foreign firm prefers DFI if its relative 







E I DFI I p p ,  2 / a < "t , 
 
which boils down to, after substitution of values from (8) and (11), 
 
( ) F t t ³ - a
9
4
,  2 / a < "t .                                                                                      (27) 
 
It satisfies the viability condition of DFI given in (20ii). The strict equality defines 
the pair of t and F such that foreign firm is indifferent between DFI and export when the 
home firm innovates: 
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( ) ( ) F t t t F
I = - º a
9
4
.                                                                                            (28) 
 
It is easy to check that 
I F   is an increasing (and concave) function of the tariff level 
2 / a < "t .
3 
The output and profit of foreign firm from export become zero when 
E I
p t t
, 2 / = =a . 
So  foreign  firm  may  export  the  product  for  2 / 0 a < < t   and  then  for 
( ) 2 / 2 / c t + < < a a   the only option open to the foreign firm is DFI given the viability 
condition (20ii). 
Finally  under  no-innovation  by  the  home  firm,  the  foreign  firm  adopts  the  DFI 







E NI DFI NI p p . 
 
Which boils down to, after substitution of values from (14) and (17), 
 
( ) F t c t ³ - + a
9
4
.                                                                                                    (29) 
 
Once again the strict equality defines the pair of t and F such that the foreign firm is 
indifferent between DFI and export when the home firm does not innovate: 
 
( ) ( ) F t c t t F
NI = - + º a
9
4
.                                                                                      (30) 
 








Moreover it increases faster than  ( ) t F
I .
4 
It  can  also  be  verified  that  the  value  of 
NI F   at  the  prohibitive  tariff 
( ) 2 /
, c t
E NI
p + = a , at which it reaches its maximum value is  ( ) 9 /
2 c + a . 
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These curvature properties and inequalities help us draw Figure 2. The curves  ( ) t F
I  
and  ( ) t F
NI   divide the  decision space  of the foreign firm  labeled (e), (f), (g), (h) in 
Figure 2 for different strategies of the home firm. 
 
 

















Figure 2.    Decision Space of the Foreign Firm 
 
 
The following Lemmas are then immediate 
 
Lemma 4.    ( ) t F F
I < " , DFI is the dominating strategy of the foreign firm. 
 
Proof 
From (28) and (30), it follows that 
 
( ) ( ) t t F t F
NI I " < .                                                                                              (31) 
 
Thus, by (27) and (29)  ( ) t F F
I < " , 
E I DFI I ,
2
,
2 p p > , 
E NI DFI NI ,
2
,
2 p p > . 
Hence the claim. 
 
In region (e) of Figure 2, the dominating strategy of the foreign firm is DFI. INNOVATION UNDER THE THREAT OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT  93 
Lemma 5.    ( ) t F F
NI > " , export is the dominating strategy of the foreign firm. 
 
Proof 
Given (33), it immediately follows that  ( ) t F F
NI > " , 
E NI DFI NI ,
2
,
2 p p < , 
E I DFI I ,
2
,
2 p p < . 
Hence the claim. 
 
In region (g) of Figure 2, the dominating strategy of the foreign firm is export. 
 
Lemma 6.    ( ) ( ) t F F t F
NI I < < " , the foreign firm’s strategy is conditional upon 
the strategy choice of the home firm. 
 
Proof 
When  F  is  within  the  intermediate  range  i.e.,  ( ) ( ) t F F t F
NI I < < ,  no  such 
dominating strategy exists. Optimal strategy of the foreign firm is subject to the strategy 
chosen by the home firm. If the home firm innovates, the foreign firm’s optimal strategy 
will be export. If the home firm prefers no-innovation, foreign firm’s optimal strategy is 
DFI for 
 
( ) t F F
I > " , by (27) 
E I DFI I ,
2
,
2 p p < ,  2 / a < "t , 
( ) t F F
NI < " , by (29) 
E NI DFI NI ,
2
,
2 p p >   " ( ) 2 / c t + < a . 
Hence the claim. 
 
Region (f) of Figure 2 corresponds to all (t, F) for which  ( ) ( ) t F F t F
NI I < <   holds. 
Thus  in  region  (f)  foreign  firm  adopts  two  different  strategies  for  different  strategy 
choice of home firm. But in Region (h) the foreign firm has only one choice, DFI, if 
home firm does not innovate. If the home firm innovates, the foreign firm does not enter 
at all. 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  determine  the  Nash  equilibrium  of  simultaneous 
decision making game when both the home firm and the foreign firm simultaneously 
choose  their  optimal  strategies.  The  Nash  equilibrium  strategy  pairs  for  different 
parametric configurations are summarized in Table 1 and are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.    Optimum Decision Space of the Foreign and the Home Firm 
 
 
We will analyse whether Nash equilibrium exists for each regions. Let 
*
j s   be the 
optimal  strategy  of  jth  firm.  In  case  of  sufficiently  low  R&D  cost,  i.e., 
( ) c
c




For the combination  ( ) 1 1 1 , , t F R ,  I s =
*
1   "   2 s   and  DFI s =
*
2   "   1 s . 




1 = \ . 
For the combination  ( ) 1 3 1 , , t F R ,  I s =
*
1   "  2 s   and  E s =
*
2   "   1 s . 




1 = \ . 
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2   but  I s =
*
1   "   2 s . 




1 = \ . 













DFI s if NI




1   but  DFI s =
*
2   "   1 s . 
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1   but  E s =
*
2   "   1 s . 
Here Nash equilibrium does not exist. 
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Hence multiple Nash equilibrium exist. 




1 = \ . 
 
From the above analysis, let us summarize the strategy choice of the home firm and 
the foreign firm. 
In general the possible Nash equilibrium for different parametric configurations are 
summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1.    Strategy Choice of the Firms for  2 / 0 a < < t  
  DFI R R < < 0   ( ) t R R R
E DFI < <   ( ) R t R
E <  
( ) t F F
I < < 0   (I, DFI)  (NI, DFI)  (NI, DFI) 
( ) ( ) t F F t F
NI I < <   (I, E)  (I, E), (NI, DFI)  (NI, DFI) 
( ) F t F
NI <   (I, E)  (I, E)  (NI, E) 
 
 
Thus, whereas the nature of Nash equilibrium for  2 / a < "t   depends on the values 
of  R  and  F,  for  ( ) t R R R
E DFI < <   and  ( ) ( ) t F F t F
NI I < < ,  there  are  two  Nash 
equilibrium  strategy  pairs.  For  this  intermediate  range  of  innovation  cost  emerges 
another interesting outcome which is summarized in proposition below. 
 
Proposition  1.    Possibility  of  DFI  by  itself  lowers  the  incentive  of  innovation 
( ) t R R R
E DFI < < " . 
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Proof 
For  these  moderate  R&D  costs,  i.e.,  ( ) t R R R
E DFI < <   by  Lemma  3  and  a  Nash 
equilibrium strategies described in Table 1, the home firm innovates only if the foreign 
firm chooses exports as its mode of entry. But when the foreign firm prefers DFI, the 
home  firm  does  not  innovate.  That  is,  (I,  DFI)  can  never  be  a  Nash  equilibrium 
( ) t R R R
E DFI < < " . 
Hence proved.   
 
What emerges from Proposition 1 is that more intense foreign competition in the 
form of DFI lowers the incentive for innovation by the home firm. The intuition is that 
more  intense  competition  lowers  the  post-innovation  profit  for  the  home  firm  and 




4.    CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have studied the impact of trade and investment liberalization on the 
domestic process innovation level where a foreign firm has two modes of entry in the 
home market; it may export the product by giving tariff to local government or it may 
opt for direct production in the home country by investing a fixed amount to avoid tariff. 
In competition with the foreign firm, the home firm may innovate a fixed amount in 
order to reduce its marginal cost with some fixed R&D cost. Under this scenario, we 
have analysed the implication of foreign competition on the innovation decision of the 
home firm. Obviously time structure of decision making affects the optimal strategies by 
the  firms.  Under  liberalized  regime  when  both  firms  choose  their  strategies 
simultaneously,  the  possibility  of  domestic  innovation  would  be  much  restricted 
compared to the case where the foreign firm has only one mode of entry, i.e., exports. 
The home firm always innovate (does not innovate) if the innovation cost is itself very 
low (high) whatever be the mode of entry by the foreign firm. For the intermediate range 
of innovation cost, the home firm would not innovate if the foreign firm goes for DFI; 
otherwise it innovates. 
We may extend this theoretical analysis where the firms move sequentially. For this 
purpose we may construct a three stage game. If the foreign firm moves first, it decides 
about its own strategy option in the first stage. After this choice in the second stage the 









, if the home firm innovates, high tariff prohibits the export mode of entry. For the 
intermediate range of F, innovation becoming the strictly dominating strategy of the home firm prohibits the 
entry of FDI. Thus, SPE is innovation and no-entry. For moderate R&D costs multiple equilibrium exists, i.e., 
either innovation and no-entry or no-innovation and FDI. INNOVATION UNDER THE THREAT OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT  97 
decide about their outputs and realized profits. Obviously for the intermediate range of 
R&D cost the foreign firm choose DFI instead of exports in order to avoid tariff. Hence 
the home firm decides not to innovate as it becomes impossible for it to reap the return 
of investment under direct competition through DFI. Thus when the foreign firm moves 
first the scope of innovation is much restricted compared to the case of simultaneous 
movement. However if the sunk cost of DFI is very high, then only the foreign firm will 
export  the  product  and  the  home  firm  decides  to  innovate.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
domestic innovation may be higher when the home firm takes its innovation decision 
first before the decision taken by the foreign firm about its mode of entry. As the first 
mover the home firm chooses to innovate in the intermediate range excepting the case of 
sufficiently low sunk cost of DFI. Again it decides to innovate for some higher R&D 
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